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INTRODUCTION

Jack and Jill went up the hill,
To fetch a pail of water;
Jackfell down, and broke his crown,
And Jill came tumbling after.I
Eachfiled suit againstthe brute,
Who owned the landand well;
Jack sued the med whofixed his head,
And the maker of the pail.
Jack stopped short ofgoing to court,
Forcompromise rearedits head,
Partiesmet to settle their debt,
And litigation henceforth was dead
Jack and Jill are by no means anomalies: the majority of
litigation ends in settlement rather than judgment. 2 This comes as
no surprise given the general "belief that it is good policy to favor
compromises" over litigation. 3 Louisiana jurisprudence and
legislation, however, undermine that goal. There is a tangled web
of judicial confusion surrounding settlement agreements in
Louisiana, specifically surrounding the doctrines of compromise
and accord and satisfaction, thus leaving creditors and debtors

Copyright 2008, by SALLY BROWN RICHARDSON.
1. Jack and Jill,reprintedin THE REAL MOTHER GOOSE 49 (Scholastic Inc.
1994) (1916).
2. See Patricia Munch Danzon & Lee A. Lillard, Settlement Out of Court.
The Disposition of Medical Malpractice Claims, 12 J. LEG. STUD. 345, 365
(1983) (stating that "less than 10 percent of [medical malpractice claims] are
tried to verdict"); Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 374, 405
(1982) ("Eighty-five to ninety percent of all federal civil suits end by
settlement.").
3. Albert J. Rosenthal, Discord and Dissatisfaction:Section 1-207 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 48, 55 (1978). Courts have also
noted this desire to have parties settle disputes. See Potter v. Pac. Coast Lumber
Co., 234 P.2d 16, 22 (Cal. 1951) ("The law wisely favors settlements.");
Thomas v. Hollowell, 155 N.E.2d 827, 829 (Ill. App. 2d 1959) ("It has always
been the policy of the law to favor compromise and settlement, and it is
especially important to sustain that principle in this age of voluminous
litigation."). Such policy goals are also recognized in Louisiana jurisprudence.
See Carney v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 250 So. 2d 776, 779 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1970) ("It is well settled that the law favors compromise and voluntary
settlement of disputes out of court with the attendant saving of time and expense
to both the litigants and the court.").
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unsure of whether they have settled a dispute. Such uncertainty in
the law discourages rather than encourages settlement. 4
Imagine a run of the mill situation between Jack and Jill.
Slightly older and wiser, but still lacking indoor plumbing, Jill
makes a deal with Jack: she will pay him $10 to provide her with a
regular sized pail of water. Jack shakes her hand, masters the hill,
and returns with an extra-largesized pail of water, which he leaves
on her doorstep. Jack sends Jill a bill for $15-the pail was, after
all, extra-large-and she replies with a check for $10, noting on
the back, "For the full amount." Jack sees the notation, cashes the
check, and sends a letter to Jill stating, "I cashed your check, but
you still owe me $5."
Can Jack sue Jill for the remaining $5, or, by cashing her
check, did Jack settle the dispute? In Louisiana, it depends because
the state has adopted both the civil law doctrine of compromise
and the common law doctrine of accord and satisfaction. Applying
the doctrine of compromise, Jack may have a cause of action
against Jill for the disputed amount. Applying the traditional
common law doctrine of accord and satisfaction, however, the
dispute between Jack and Jill was settled the moment Jack cashed
the check.6 But, under a different interpretation of accord and
satisfaction utilized by some Louisiana courts, Jack may still be
able to litigate his claim. 7 In short, the answer to the question is
4. The notion that uncertainty in the law encourages litigation is discussed
at length by law and economics scholars George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein.
See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 16-17 (1984). Priest and Klein illustrate how
uncertainty in the law can lead to more litigation by comparing the situation to
betting on a sporting event. When the outcome of the game is certain, as when
"a powerful team is scheduled to play a weak one," the lack of uncertainty
generates less interest in the game among bettors. Id. at 16. When there is great
uncertainty in the outcome, however, bettors are more likely to gamble. Priest
and Klein argue that, "[i]n litigation, as in gambling, agreement over the
outcome leads parties to drop out." Id. at 17.
5. See, e.g., RTL Corp. v. Mfr.'s Enters., Inc., 429 So. 2d 855 (La. 1983);
Willard v. R & B Falcon Drilling USA, Inc., 836 So. 2d 424 (La. App. 1st Cir.
2002); Angelo & Son, Inc. v. Rapides Bank & Trust Co., 671 So. 2d 1283 (La.
App. 3d Cit.), writ denied, 675 So. 2d 1083 (La. 1996); Shell Oil Co. v. Jackson,
655 So. 2d 482 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1995); Hall v. Mgmt. Recruiters of New
Orleans, Inc., 332 So. 2d 509 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
6. See, e.g., Henriques v. Vaccaro, 56 So. 2d 236 (La. 1951); Berger v.
Quintero, 127 So. 356 (La. 1930); Davis-Wood Lumber Co. v. Farnsworth &
Co., 171 So. 622 (La. Ct. App. 1937); Sentell v. Wilcox, 3 Teiss. 503 (La. Ct.
App. 1906).
7. See, e.g., Selber Bros., Inc. v. Newstadt's Shoe Stores, 14 So. 2d 10 (La.
1943); Pool Co. v. Universal Mach. Co., 701 So. 2d 1014 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1997); McClelland v. Sec. Indus. Ins. Co., 426 So. 2d 665 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1982), writ denied,430 So. 2d 94 (La. 1983).
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that Jack's outcome depends on which doctrine and what
interpretation of that doctrine is applied. To make matters worse,
Jack has no means of determining which doctrine or what
interpretation will apply until he sees the inside of a courtroom.
At least that was the state of settlement agreements in
Louisiana prior to June 25, 2007, when the Civil Code articles
pertaining to compromise were amended.8 This Comment strives
to establish how the revised articles-specifically Louisiana Civil
Code article 3071 regarding compromise and article 3079
regarding accord and satisfaction-may harmonize the present
discord between these settlement mechanisms, thereby firmly
and, in turn,
establishing the rights of creditors and debtors,
9
promoting settlement as opposed to litigation.
To reach this end, this Comment is divided into four parts. Part
I defines the doctrines of compromise and accord and satisfaction
within the legal systems from which Louisiana drew them. The
history of the foundation of Louisiana's legal system l° and the
similarities between Louisiana's original compromise article and
that of the Code Napoleon11 provide evidence that Louisiana12
acquired the concept of compromise from its civilian ancestors.
8. 2007 La. Acts No. 138.
9. See Priest & Klein, supra note 4.
10. From the time it was discovered by Europeans in 1699, to the time it
was purchased by the United States in 1803, Louisiana was consistently under
the French or Spanish rule of law. It was well-documented that these civilian
legal systems continued to influence Louisiana's legal system even after 1803,
as the Code Napoleon of 1804 was heavily relied on by those tasked with
drafting the Louisiana Digest of 1808 and the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825. For
excellent discussions on the legal history of Louisiana, see Rodolfo Batiza,
Origins of Modern Codificationof the Civil Law: The FrenchExperience andIts
Implicationsfor LouisianaLaw, 56 TUL. L. REV. 477 (1982); John T. Hood, Jr.,
The History and Development of the Louisiana Civil Code, 33 TUL. L. REV. 7
(1958); J.-R. Trahan, The ContinuingInfluence of le Droit Civil and el Derecho
Civil in the PrivateLaw of Louisiana,63 LA. L. REV. 1019 (2003).
11. Compare LA. DIG. art. 1, at 434 (1808) ("A transaction is an agreement
between two or more persons who for preventing or putting an end to a law suit,
adjust their differences, by mutual consent, in the manner which they agree on
and which every one of them prefers to the hope of gaining, balanced by the
danger of losing.") with CODE CIVIL [C. clv.] art. 2044 (1804) (Fr.) (trans.
author) ("La transaction est un contrat par lequel les parties terminent une
contestation n~e, ou pr~viennent une contestation i naitre." ["A transaction is a
contract whereby the parties terminate a litigation which has arisen, or prevent a
litigation from arising."]).
12. It should be noted that while Louisiana's compromise articles were
largely influenced by its French ancestors, compromise is not exclusive to
French civil law; it is also included in German civil law. See BORGERLICHES
GESETZBUCH [BGB] [Civil Code] Aug. 18, 1896, § 779. It has been stated that
the German form of compromise is similar to the French version. SAUL
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The doctrine of accord and satisfaction, on the other hand, was3
borrowed by Louisiana courts from the American common law.'
Part II looks beyond the textual definition of the settlement
agreements and depicts the analytical approaches used by their
respective legal systems to determine whether a settlement has
been reached. Generally speaking, the civil law inquiry for
compromise focuses on the subjective intent of the parties, whereas
the common law examination for accord and satisfaction relies
predominately on the parties' outward actions. 14 Part III examines
the application of each method of settlement in Louisiana and
identifies how the muddled use of both doctrines has created
judicial confusion. Part IV suggests how the newly enacted articles
may provide a solution to the problems that have surrounded
Louisiana settlement agreements. Finally, this Comment concludes
that the recent revision has untangled the web of judicial confusion
but has done so at a potentially high price.
LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS § 372, in 6 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 636
(1969) [hereinafter LITVINOFF (OBLIGATIONS)]. Be that as it may, given the

French influence on Louisiana (supra note 10), this Comment focuses on the
French version of compromise, and, in as much as they help explain concepts
presented herein, the legal systems of countries that have been predominately
influenced by the Code Napoleon.
13. Based on the sources initially cited by Louisiana courts to support the use
of this settlement method, it is evident that Louisiana was strongly influenced by
the American common law. In Berger v. Quintero, 127 So. 356, 357 (La. 1930),
an early case in which the court applied the doctrine of accord and satisfaction, the
Louisiana Supreme Court cited five cases for support of the use of the doctrine.
All of the cases were from common law states. Accord and satisfaction, however,
is not limited to the American common law; it exists under the English common
law, as well. See, e.g., Foakes v. Beer, (1884) 9 Eng. Rep. 605, 616 (H.L.)
(holding that a valid accord and satisfaction requires consideration, such as "a
horse, hawk, or robe"). Due to the sources originally cited by Louisiana courts,
this Comment concentrates on the American common law.
14. This Comment employs the terms subjective and objective as
descriptions of the analytical approaches adopted by the two legal systems. A
subjective approach is defined herein as an inquiry into "a party's will to bind
himself'; an objective approach is defined as an examination of the "outward
manifestation or expression of that will." Satil Litvinoff, Consent Revisited:
Offer Acceptance Option Right of FirstRefusal and Contracts ofAdhesion in the
Revision of the Louisiana Law of Obligations,47 LA. L. REv. 699, 700 (1987).
Use of these correlative terms should not imply that civil law judges use only a
subjective approach or that common law judges use only an objective approach.
That is a false caricature of the two legal systems. As described in this
Comment, infra Part III.B, use of the approaches may be viewed as if on a
spectrum, pure objectivity sitting at one end and pure subjectivity standing at the
other. The terminology used within this Comment indicates which side of the
spectrum each legal system leans towards; it does not indicate that either legal
system's analysis occupies an actual endpoint of that spectrum.
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I. DEFINITION: WHAT ARE COMPROMISE AND ACCORD AND
SATISFACTION?

To unravel Louisiana's tangled web regarding settlement
agreements, the first questions that must be answered are ones of
definition. What is civil law compromise? What is common law
accord and satisfaction?
A. Civil Law Compromise
In civil law jurisdictions, a compromise is an agreement by
which parties end or prevent litigious obligations through
reciprocal concessions.1 5 There are four requirements for a valid
compromise: (1) existence of litigation, (2) agreement between the
parties, (3) intention of ending or preventing the litigation, and (4)
reciprocal concessions made by the parties.
For an illustration of how these requirements operate, recall the
dispute between Jack and Jill. Upon leaving the pail of water for
Jill, Jack thinks he is owed $15. Jill believes she only owes $10.
Instead of rushing to the nearest courthouse, the two sit down,
15. C. civ. art. 2044 (1999) (Fr.) (trans. author) ("La transaction est un
contrat par lequel les parties terminent une contestation n6e, ou pr6viennent une
contestation Anaitre." ["A transaction is a contract whereby the parties terminate
a litigation which has arisen, or prevent a litigation from arising."]); CoDIGO
CIVIL [C.C.] art. 1809 (2006) (Spain) (trans. author) ("La transacci6n es un
contrato por el cual las partes, dando, prometiendo o reteniendo cada una alguna
cosa, evitan la provacaci6n de un pleito o ponen t6rmino al que habia
comenzado." ["A transaction is a contract by which the parties, by giving,
promising, or retaining something, avoid the filing of a suit or put an end to one
that has already been instituted."]).
16. Some civilian scholars have written that there are three requirements for
a valid compromise. See AUBRY & RAU, PETrrs CONTRACT RESPONSABILITE, §
418, in VI DROIT CIVIL FRAN4AIS 242-43 (1951) [hereinafter AUBRY & RAU
(DROIT CIVIL FRANqAIs)] (trans. author) (a transaction requires: (1) consent of
the parties, (2) existence or the possibility of a dispute between the parties, and
(3) reciprocal concessions or sacrifices of the parties); GUILLERMO A. BORDA,
OBLIGACIONES § 923, in 1 TRATADO DE DERECHO CIVIL 675 (4th ed.) (trans.
author) (a transaction requires: (1) an agreement of wills, (2) reciprocal
concessions, and (3) concessions extinguish the litigious or doubtful
obligations); LrrvINOFF (OBLIGATIONS), supra note 12, at 637 (a transaction
requires: (1) existence of litigation, (2) intention of ending the litigation; and (3)
reciprocal concessions of the parties). These interpretations are consistent with
the four requirements discussed in this Comment. Aubry and Rau incorporate
the intention to end or prevent litigation within the requirement that the
possibility of litigation exists. Borda incorporates the requirement of litigation
into the requirement that concessions be made to extinguish the litigious
obligation. Litvinoff places all of the requirements as conditions for there being
a valid agreement between the parties.
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discuss their differences, and reach an agreement: Jill will pay Jack
$12.50 for the pail of water. At this point, Jack and Jill have
compromised. They have reached an agreement that prevented
litigation from occurring by making reciprocal concessions.
This simple situation highlights how the requirements for a
valid compromise function. The first requirement-that litigation
exist--does not require present judicial litigation to exist, though
such would certainly suffice. 17 Jack has not commenced an action
against Jill; there is only a disagreement between the two. The
mere existence of a disagreement, or even the belief that a dispute
will arise,' 8 constitutes litigation for the purposes of reaching a
compromise.1 9 It is easy to understand why such disagreement is
required: if the parties did not disagree, there would be nothing
about which to settle. Had Jack and Jill both initially believed that
Jack was owed $15, then the two would have no dispute to resolve.
Once a dispute has arisen, the second requirement is the natural
next step towards reaching a compromise: there must be an
agreement between the parties. In civil law jurisdictions, "an
agreement is the accord of two or more persons on an object of
juridical interest."20 Jack and Jill reached an agreement at the
moment they both consented that payment of $12.50 would settle
their dispute.
The third requirement establishes the cause of the parties'
compromise. For a valid compromise to exist, the agreement must
intend to end or prevent the litigation. 2 1 If a dispute arises and the
parties enter into an agreement, then the goal of that agreement
must be to resolve the dispute via settlement rather than judgment.
Otherwise, the agreement does not serve the purpose of a
17. CIVIL CODE [C.C.Q.] art. 2631 (2001) (Qu6bec) ("Transaction is a
contract by which the parties prevent a future contestation, put an end to a
lawsuit or settle difficulties arising in the execution of a judgment, by way of
mutual concessions or reservations."); FRANCO-ITALIAN PROJET art. 588 (1927)
(trans. J.-R. Trahan, translation on file with author) ("Transaction is a contract
whereby the parties, by means of mutual concessions, terminate litigation that
has already arisen or avert litigation that might arise between them."); CIVIL
CODE [C. Civ.] art. 3307 (1960) (Eth.) ("Transaction is a contract by which the
parties, by making reciprocal concessions, terminate an existing dispute or
prevent a future one.").
18. AUBRY & RAU (DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS), supra note 16, at 242.
19. Such litigation is referred to as extra-judicial litigation. Id.at 244;
LITVINOFF (OBLIGATIONS), supranote 12, at 637.
20. AUBRY & RAu, OBLIGATIONS § 340, in 1 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS 296
(trans. La. State Law Inst. 1965) [hereinafter AUBRY & RAu (CIVIL LAW
TRANSLATIONS)].

21.

C.C. art. 1809 (2006) (Spain); C. CIv. art. 3307 (1960) (Eth.); FRANCO-

ITALIAN PROJET art. 588 (1927) (trans. J.-R. Trahan, translation on file with

author).
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compromise, as the disagreement between the parties will continue
to exist.
The last requirement for a valid compromise is not as intuitive
as the first three, but it distinguishes a compromise from other
forms of settlement in civilianJurisdictions: reciprocal concessions
must be made by the parties. There are other methods of settling
disputes in civil law systems "in which the sacrifice is made by one
of the parties alone," such as renunciation. 23 Requiring that Jack
and Jill both concede something to one another is what makes their
agreement a compromise. 24
In sum, a compromise is an agreement between parties that has
the goal of ending or preventing litigation through reciprocal
concessions. In order for a compromise to exist, there must be a
dispute, the parties must reach an agreement that has as its goal to
end or prevent litigation, and reciprocal concessions must be made.
B. Common Law Accord and Satisfaction
In the American common law, the term "accord and
satisfaction" is used to express "the legal consequence of a
creditor's acceptance of a substitute performance for a previously
existing claim or prior original duty." 25 As the conjunctive name
implies, accord and satisfaction consists of two distinct parts. The
"accord" of an accord and satisfaction is an agreement in which the
creditor promises to accept the substitute performance for the preexisting claim or duty.26 The "satisfaction" is the actual acceptance
by the creditor of that substitute performance.27 Used together,
these terms represent the legal consequence of accepting
22. AJBRY & RAu (DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS), supra note 16, at 243
("Transaction supposes reciprocal concessions or sacrifices on behalf of each
party."); BORDA, supra note 16, at 674 ("Transaction is the act by virtue of
which the parties, making reciprocal concessions, extinguish litigious or
doubtful obligations.").
23. LITVINOFF (OBLIGATIONS), supra note 12, at 638. Renunciation is "an
act whereby a person abdicates or abandons a right." AUBRY & RAu (CIVIL LAW
TRANSLATIONS), supra note 20, at 219.
24. In Jack and Jill's dispute, the reciprocal obligations are Jack's
agreement to accept $2.50 less than what he believes is owed, and Jill's
agreement to pay $2.50 more than what she believes she owes. Though such
reciprocal obligations are equal in monetary value, equality is not a requirement.
See BORDA, supra note 16, at 674 (example of a doctor believing $100 is owed,
the patient believing $10 is owed, and the parties compromising on $50).
25.

SARAH HOWARD JENKINS, DISCHARGE § 70.1, in 13 CORBIN ON

CONTRACTS 301 (13th ed. 2003) [hereinafter CORBIN].
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 281(1) (1981); E. ALLEN
FARNSWORTH, § 4.24, in 1 FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 468 (1990).
27. FARNSWORTH, supra note 26.
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performance of the accord as satisfaction,28 the
29 legal consequence
being the discharge of the prior claim or duty.
There are three requirements for a valid discharge of an
existing claim or duty by accord and satisfaction: (1) existence of a
claim or duty, (2) offer and acceptance of a substitute performance
in full settlement, and (3) proper consideration. 30 The operation of
these requirements can be demonstrated by the dispute of Jack and
Jill. Jack believes he is owed $15; Jill believes she only owes $10.
The two discuss their differences and reach an agreement that Jill
will pay Jack $12.50. Jill then writes Jack a check for $12.50,
31
which he accepts.
-is
duty
or
claim
of
a
prior
The first requirement-existence
is
duty
or
claim
clearly met in the hypothetical. An existing
a
offer
to
for
which
is
nothing
it,
there
required, because, without
sum
a
Jack
to
pay
duty
a
substitute performance. Had Jill not had
of money, she would have had no reason to offer the substitute
payment.
existing claim or duty need not
the prior
32
In the common law,
••
accord and satisfaction may
A
valid
or
unliquidated.
dispute
be in
such claims are rarely
though
exist without an actual dispute,
litigated.33 Jack and Jill could have both initially agreed that Jill
owed Jack $15. Thereafter, the two could have revised that
agreement to say that Jill would give Jack $10 along with her
28. CORBIN, supra note 25.
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 281(1) (1981).
30. See T.J. Trauner Assocs., Inc. v. Cooper-Benton, Inc., 820 F.2d 643,
645 (3d Cir. 1987) ("elements of accord and satisfaction are (1) a disputed debt,
(2) a clear and unequivocal offer of payment in full satisfaction of the debt, and
(3) acceptance and retention of payment by the offeree"); Nat'l Steel &
Shipbuilding Co. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 579, 589 (Fed. Cl. 2001)
("elements of an accord and satisfaction are: (1) proper subject matter; (2)
competent parties; (3) a meeting of the minds of the parties; and (4)
consideration"); 1 C.J.S. Accord and Satisfaction § 8 (2005) (For an accord and
satisfaction, "there must be a proper subject matter, competent parties, offer and
acceptance, a meeting of the minds of the parties, and a proper consideration.")
(footnotes omitted).
31. CORBIN, supra note 25; ALVA R. HUNT, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION COMPROMISE AND COMPOSITION AT COMMON LAW

5(1912).
32. CORBIN, supra note 25, at 308. Unliquidated is defined as "not
previously specified or determined." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1574 (Bryan
A. Garner ed., 8th ed. 2004). A dispute, on the other hand, is a "conflict or
controversy." Id. at 505. For clarification of how disputed claims differ from
unliquidated claims, imagine that Jack and Jill enter into an agreement that
involves Jill paying Jack a sum of money. If the amount Jill owes has yet to be
determined, the amount is unliquidated.If the two disagree about the amount
owed, the amount is disputed.
33. CORBiN, supra note 25, at 308.
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collection of eggshells. 34 Paying $10 plus the eggshells is a
substitute performance for the original agreement. As such, the
promise by Jack to accept the $10 plus the eggshells in lieu of
receiving $15 for fetching the pail of water operates as an accord.
Upon acceptance of the substitute performance, the accord will be
satisfied, and the existing duty will be discharged.
The requirement that a prior claim or duty exist gives rise to
the second requirement: offer and acceptance of a substitute
performance in full settlement. 35 In reaching this offer and
acceptance, "there must be an assent to, and a meetin of the minds
of both parties upon the terms of the new agreement." The parties
must also agree that the substitute performance will satisfy the
existing claim or duty. 37 Within this second requirement, there are
three elements. First, there must be an offer and acceptance.
Second, that offer and acceptance must be for a substitute
performance. And third, the substitute performance must be in full
settlement of the existing claim or duty.
In order for the second requirement to be met, there first must
be an offer and an acceptance. This has also been characterized as
requiring "a mutual agreement between the parties in which one
pays or performs and the other accepts paym8ent or performance in
satisfaction of a claim or demand .. .. " The use of the term
"agreement" is not incorrect but may be misleading with regards to
the timeframe within which an accord and satisfaction can operate.
An agreement in the common law is "a manifestation of mutual
assent on the part of two or more persons." 39 Stating that Jack and
Jill entered into an agreement paints a picture of the two sitting
down, discussing their differing opinions, establishing the
settlement amount, and subsequently performing their agreement.
While this is one manner by which an accord and satisfaction
occurs, 40 it is not the only manner, and it is not the manner most
often litigated.4 1 An accord and satisfaction can also discharge a
claim or duty without a prior agreement; the discharge may occur

34. The eggshells are a collector's item, as they are from Humpty Dumpty's
great fall. Humpty Dumpty, in THE REAL MOTHER GOOSE 40 (Scholastic Inc.
1994) (1916).
35. 1 C.J.S. Accord and Satisfaction § 8 (2005); HUNT, supra note 31, at 5.
36. HUNT, supra note 31, at 6.
37. CORBIN, supra note 25, at 304; HUNT, supra note 31, at 5.
38. Nev. Half Moon Mining Co. v. Combined Metals Reduction Co., 176
F.2d 73, 76 (10th Cir. 1949).
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (1981).
40. CORBIN, supra note 25, at 301-03.
41. Id.at 303.
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by instantaneous offer and acceptance. In this situation, the
acceptance by the creditor and the performance by the debtor occur
simultaneously.
As an illustration of how these methods differ, assume Jill
believes the amount owed is $10; Jack believes the amount due is
$15. Jack and Jill discuss their differing opinions and decide that
Jill will pay Jack $12.50. Jill then pays Jack. At the moment when
there is a meeting of the minds between Jack and Jill that payment
of $12.50 will settle their dispute, they have entered into an
agreement. Not until that agreement is performed, however, will
Jill's duty to Jack be discharged through a valid accord and
satisfaction.
Now assume that instead of discussing the matter, Jill simply
sends Jack a check for $10 with the notation "in full settlement" on
the back. Jack deposits the check. In this situation, a valid accord
and satisfaction exists. Jill offered a substitute performance when
she sent the notated check to Jack. Jack accepted this offer when
he deposited the check. Though there is no prior agreement, Jack's
acceptance and the discharge of Jill's existing duties occur
simultaneously. 43 As such, it is not incorrect to state that the
second requirement for a valid accord and satisfaction is that there
must be an agreement for a substitute performance in full
settlement. For clarification, however, the second requirement is
better described as necessitating an offer and acceptance of a
substitute performance in full settlement.
For the second requirement to be met the offer and acceptance
must be for a substitute performance. In the common law, a
substitute performance must be distinguished from a substitute
contract. 4 5 Though the two are very similar, the distinction
between them for the purposes of accord and satisfaction is the
timeline by which each discharges the prior existing claim or duty.
A substitute contract discharges the prior duty at the moment the
parties reach an agreement. A substitute performance does not

42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Deuches v. Grand Rapids Brass Co., 215 N.W. 392, 393
(Mich. 1927) (holding that "to effectuate accord and satisfaction a prior
agreement is not necessary").

44.

CORBIN,

supra note 25, at 273.

45. "A substituted contract is a contract that is itself accepted by the obligee
in satisfaction of the obligor's existing duty." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 279(1) (1981). See also CORBIN, supra note 25, at 398-99 (A
substitute contract acts as "a change in prospective rights or obligations without
extinguishing or discharging a contractual relationship.") (footnote omitted).
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 279(2) (1981).
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discharge the existing duty until the performance is executed.47 In
the situation in which Jack and Jill reach an agreement regarding
the amount owed, if that agreement operates as a substitute
contract, 48 then Jill's original duty to Jack is discharged at the
moment the agreement is formed. If the agreement does not
operate as a substitute contract, then Jill's payment to Jack is a
substitute performance. Her original duty, therefore, is not
discharged until the moment of performance. The latter situation
constitutes an accord and satisfaction; the former does not.
Finally, in order for the second requirement to be met, the
substitute performance must be made in full settlement. 49 In other
words, the substitute performance must completely discharge the
prior claim or duty. This element is required to ensure that upon
satisfaction of the accord, the prior claim or duty is fully
extinguished.5 °
The last requirement for a valid accord and satisfaction to exist
is that "new, valuable, and legal consideration" be present. 51
Consideration is a bargained for performance or return promise.
Therefore, for a promise to give, do, or not do, there must be a quid
pro quo, something given, done, or not done in return. 53 In the
context of accord and satisfaction, courts have held that "[t]he
consideration is the resolution of a disputed claim. ' '54 If Jill pays
47. Noyes v. Pierce, 122 A. 896, 898 (Vt. 1923) ("It was not the mere
promise to pay the money, but the payment of the money itself, that the plaintiff
agreed to accept in discharge of the obligation. To hold otherwise would be to
enlarge the contract to an agreement to accept the new promise of defendant to
pay the money in lieu of the money as agreed, which is not permissible.");
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 281(1) (1981); HUNT, supra note 31,
at 161. For a recent court discussion of how accord and satisfaction and
substitute contracts differ as to when existing claims and duties are discharged,
see Ryder v. Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A., 501 F. Supp. 2d 311, 319 (D. Conn. 2007).
48. Whether an agreement operates as a substitute contract is one of
interpretation to be "gleaned from the expressions of the parties." CORBIN, supra
note 25, at 403 (footnotes omitted).
49. Id.at 308-09; HuNT, supra note 31, at 5.
50. See I C.J.S. Accord and Satisfaction § 8 (2005) (stating that "the
contract must finally and definitely close the matter covered by it, so that
nothing of or pertaining to that matter is left unsettled, or open to further
question or arrangement").
51. Id.at6.
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(a) (1981).
53. Id.For a valid consideration, the promise may also be one in which "the
promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of
the promisee." Id.at § 90(1).
54. Paramount Aviation Corp. v. Agusta, 178 F.3d 132, 147-48 (3d Cir.
1999). See AIU Ins. Co. v. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd., 897 F. Supp. 724, 727
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("The settlement of the dispute constitutes consideration.");
Occidental Chem. Corp. v. Envtl. Liners, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 791, 793 (E.D. Pa.
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Jack $15, the consideration for her performance is the resolution of
the dispute.
In sum, parties may discharge prior existing claims and duties
through accord and satisfaction. For a valid accord and satisfaction
to exist, there must be an existing claim or duty, the parties must
offer and accept a substitute performance in full settlement of that
existing claim or duty, and there must be adequate consideration.
C. Intersection of Civil Law Compromise and Common Law
Accord and Satisfaction
As is evident by their definitions, civil law compromise and
common law accord and satisfaction strive to achieve the same
goal, namely to end disputes through settlement rather than
judgment. There are, however, characteristics that distinguish the
two. A civil law compromise may only be made over a disputed
claim; 55 a common law accord and satisfaction may exist over a
disputed or undisputed claim. 56 An accord and satisfaction requires
that the agreement between the parties be for a substitute
performance. 57 A compromise agreement may be for a substitute
performance, but a substitute contract will also suffice.58
Understanding these distinctions allows for the recognition of
the overlap of the two concepts. Both civil law compromise and
common law accord and satisfaction discharge existing, disputed
claims and duties when parties agree on a substitute performance.
Therefore, whether a settlement has been reached when there is a
disputed claim and a substitute performance may be determined by
applying the rules of either civil law compromise or common law
accord and satisfaction.

1994) ("The consideration [for a valid accord and satisfaction] is the resolution
of an unliquidated or disputed claim.") (citation omitted); Flambeau Prods.
Corp. v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 341 N.W.2d 655, 664 (Wis. 1984)
("Resolution of an actual controversy involving some subject of pecuniary value
and interest to the parties is sufficient consideration of an accord and

satisfaction.").
55.
56.
57.
note 31,
58.

AUBRY & RAU (DROIT CIVIL FRAN;AIS), supra note 16, at 242.
CORBIN, supra note 25, at 308.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §281(1) (1981); HUNT, supra

at 161.
LITVINOFF (OBLIGATIONS), supra note 12, at 644.
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II. INTERPRETATION: ARE THE Two DOCTRINES DIFFERENT?

The second questions that must be answered before
understanding how Louisiana has incorporated the two settlement
doctrines are questions of interpretation. How is existence of a
compromise evaluated under the civil law? How is existence of an
accord and satisfaction evaluated under the common law?
A. Civil Law Compromise: Subjective Inquiry
In French civil law, the literal meaning of the terms of a
contract should be used unless "the terms employed by the parties
involve in themselves some difficulty or ambiguity" or "[w]here,
in spite of their clarity, these terms taken in their literal sense
cannot be reconciled with the nature of the contract and the
apparent intention of the parties." 59 Courts are therefore
encouraged to consider the subjective intent of the parties, at the
very least to determine if the parties' apparent intent conflicts with
the words of the contract. As such, the "intellectual rigor with
which the [contract] analysis is carried through to detailed
as the picturesque
consequences" in French law has been painted 60
notion of the "subjective meeting of two minds."
This subjective approach has been utilized by French courts to
determine if a transaction-or what is referred to as a compromise
in Louisiana6 -exists. Such an analysis is illustrated in the case of
Lafon v. Rouquet.62 Lafon involved an automobile accident that left

59.

AUBRY & RAu (CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS), supra note 20, at 345. The

literal meaning of the words of the contract may also be disregarded "where the
rapprochementof two or more clauses of the agreement [give] rise to doubts on
the scope of these various clauses." Id. at 346.
60. BARRY NICHOLAS, THE FRENCH LAW OF CONTRACT 35 (2d ed. 1992).
61. In French law, the term compromis refers to a submission to arbitration.
See C. CIv. arts. 2059-61 (1999) (Fr.). Transaction under French law is the
equivalent of a compromise in the revised Louisiana law. Compare C. Civ. art.
2044 (1999) (Fr.) with LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3071 (2008). Prior to the
revision of the compromise articles in 2007, both the terms "transaction" and
"compromise" were used in the Louisiana Civil Code. The term "transaction"
was removed in the 2007 revision as it was found to be "superfluous and could
lead to confusion." LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3071 cmt. c (2008). Regardless of
whether such assertions are correct, the term "compromise" is used in this
Comment solely to refer to an agreement by which parties end or prevent
litigious obligations through reciprocal concessions. In other words, compromise
is only used herein to refer to the French notion of transaction, not the French
notion of compromis.
62. Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Montepellier, June 21,
1932, D. 1934, 1, 283 (Fr.) (trans. J.-R. Trahan, translation on file with author).
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one party seriously injured.6 3 Thereafter, the involved parties
entered into a settlement: the tortfeasor paid the victim 5,169
francs, and in exchange the victim gave an "acquittal final and
without reservation," meaning he forwent any future claims against
the tortfeasor. 64 Two years later, the victim began experiencing
seizures, which were attributed to the accident.6 The victim then
filed suit against the tortfeasor for damages of 60,000 francs. 66 In
response to the litigation, the tortfeasor claimed that the victim had
no right to judgment because theparties had settled the claim by a
transaction two years prior.67 In interpreting the alleged
transaction, the court looked to the "common intention of the
parties" and declared that despite the settlement agreement stating
the "acquittal [was] final and without reservation," the victim
"intended [to repair] only the harm that had then been
experienced"; future harm was not intended to be included.68 By
observing the subjective belief of the victim, the court found that
no transaction existed.69
The Lafon court's use of the subjective intent, as opposed to
only relying on the parties' outward actions, has been mirrored in
other French-influenced, civil law jurisdictions. In Benoit v.
Laurion, the Superior Court of Qudbec was presented with the
classic situation of a debtor owing a creditor a sum of money.7 °
The debtor sent the creditor a check with a note saying, "If you do
not accept this check in settlement, I will be forced to take
procedural steps against you." '7 1 Before accepting the check, the
creditor inserted his own conditions on its face, to the effect that he
"did not accept [the check] as a settlement but as a payment on the
account., 72 The creditor then sued the debtor for the remainder of
the amount he believed was owed.73
The debtor argued, inter alia, that the creditor "[could not]
recover because he cashed the check.", 74 Judge Archambault for the
Superior Court of Quebec did not accept the debtor's argument.
"To admit that the cashing of this check was tantamount to
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 284.
69. Id.
70. Benoit v. Laurion, [1943] C.S. 236 (Quebec) (trans. J.-R. Trahan,
translation on file with author).
71. Id. at 238.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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renunciation of his credit right by the [creditor] would be against
all principles. It is axiomatic that tacit consent results from certain
action or from certain facts that necessarily presuppose it."' 7 5 In
reaching this conclusion, the court noted that even if the check had
only borne the endorsement "in final settlement," as opposed to the
words actually written on the note, "its cashing would not have
entailed an acquiescence in this demand on the part of the
acquiescence is a question of fact and not a
[creditor]. This ' 76
question of law."
The holdings in Benoit and Lafon highlight the subjective
inquiry in which civil law jurisdictions engage when determining
whether a compromise exists. This is not to say that the sole
question of the courts is one of subjective intent; in both
aforementioned cases the courts certainly examined the outward
actions of the parties. However, in situations where the "terms
employed by the parties" at the time the alleged compromise was
entered into "cannot be reconciled with ... the apparent intention
of the parties," 77 civil law jurisdictions place greater weight in the
subjective beliefs of the parties as opposed to the actions the
parties took.
B. Common Law Accord and Satisfaction: Objective Analysis
The common law "look[s] to the outward expression of a
person as manifesting his intention rather than to his secret and
unexpressed intention." 78 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts
notes this reliance on an outward manifestation of intent of the
parties by providing that "[t]he conduct of a party may manifest
assent even though he does not in fact assent." 9 As the comments
to the Restatement establish, "[t]he phrase 'manifestation of
intention' 80adopts an external or objective standard for interpreting
conduct."
In discussing the differences in objectivity and subjectivity,
American contracts scholar Samuel Williston stated that "[t]he
point of dispute is whether actual mental assent of the parties is a
legal requisite, or merely whatever may have been in the minds of
75. Id. at 239.
76. Id. at 238.
77. AUBRY & RAU (CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS), supra note 20.
78. First Nat. Bank of Roanoke v. Roanoke Oil Co., 192 S.E. 764, 770 (Va.
1937).
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19(3) (1981). See also Lucy
v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 522 (Va. 1954) ("The mental assent of the parties is
not requisite for the formation of a contract.").
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 cmt. b (1981).
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the parties. Is the test objective or subjective?"'81 Williston
concluded that the test was objective and that the "expression of
mutual assent, and not the assent itself, [was] the essential element
of contractual liability." 82 Williston was not alone in this belief.
Common law giants such as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 83 and
Judge Learned Hand also followed this method. As Judge Hand
famously wrote:
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the
personal, or individual, intent of the parties. A contract is
an obligation attached by the mere force of law to certain
acts of the parties, usually words, which ordinarily
accompany and represent a known intent. If, however, it
were proved by twenty bishops that either party, when he
used the words, intended something else than the usual
meaning which the law imposes upon them, he would still
be held, unless there were some mutual mistake, or
something else of the sort. Of course, if it appear by other
words, or acts, of the parties, that they attribute a peculiar
meaning to such words as they use in the contract, that
meaning will prevail, but only by virtue of the
84 other words,
and not because of their unexpressed intent.
This objective analysis generally used for contract
interpretation in the common law is also used to determine the
existence of a valid accord and satisfaction. In doing so, common
law courts focus on the parties' outward actions, such as the
cashing of a check, 85 rather than their subjective intent. Such an
81. Samuel Williston, Mutual Assent in the Formationof Contracts, 14 ILL.
L. REV. 85, 85 (1919).
82. Id. at 87.
83. As Justice Holmes wrote:
We talk about a contract as a meeting of the minds of the parties, and
thence it is inferred in various cases that there is no contract because
their minds have not met .... Yet nothing is more certain than that
parties may be bound by a contract to things which neither of them
intended.
O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 463 (1897).
84. Hotchkiss v. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911),
aft'd, 201 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912), affd, 231 U.S. 50 (1913).
85. See, e.g., Rang v. Hartford Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 908 F.2d
380, 383 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that "the cashing of a check for less than the
full amount 'of a liquidated and undisputed claim' that contained a 'full
settlement' statement constituted an accord and satisfaction"); Niebler & Muren,
S.C. v. Brock-White Co. of Wis., 361 N.W.2d 732, 733 (Wis. 1984) ("Under the
common-law rule of accord and satisfaction, the creditor's cashing of a check
offered as full payment constitutes a discharge of the entire debt."); Honeysett v.
White Co., 159 A. 207, 208 (Pa. 1932) ("The general principle is well
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analysis is exemplified in the case of Dick Corp. v. Union Station
Redevelopment Corp., in which a dispute arose between two
contractually bound corporations. The corporations submitted to
arbitration, and one corporation, the creditor, was awarded a sum
of money to be paid by the other corporation, the debtor.87 The
debtor did not pay the creditor the amount owed, so the creditor
sought confirmation of the arbitration award in federal court. 88 At
this point, the debtor paid the principal amount due but did not pay
interest on that amount. 89 The debtor argued, inter alia, that its
payment of the sum "operated as an accord and satisfaction,
discharging any obligation [the debtor] had to pay interest." 90 The
Dick Corp. court questioned whether the creditor assented to such
a condition, as the court was unable to find any outward
"manifestation of intent" on the part of the creditor. 91 In response,
the debtor produced an affidavit from the creditor showing that the
creditor "had an 'understanding and belief that [the debtor's]
prompt payment of
92 the principal would satisfy [the creditor's]
claim for interest."
On this point, the court berated the debtor. "[C]ontracts can
only be formed through objective manifestations of mutual
assent.,93 The creditor's "subjective mental state is therefore
irrelevant to the court's determination of whether the parties
arrived at an accord and satisfaction."94 The court found that
because the creditor had performed no outward action to show his
mutual assent that payment would
accepted in
i full ssettlement, a
did notbeexist.
valid accord and satisfaction
The holding in Dick Corp. highlights the objective analysis that
common law jurisdictions perform when determining if prior
existing claims and duties have been discharged through a valid

established that when a claim is disputed or unliquidated and the tender of a
check or draft in settlement thereof is of such character as to give the creditor
notice that it must be accepted in full satisfaction of the claim, or not at all, the
retention and use thereof by the creditor constitutes an accord and satisfaction."
(quoting Barron Co. v. Fox & Co., 84 Pa. Super. 46, 49 (Pa. 1924))).
86. Dick Corp. v. Union Station Redevelopment Corp., No. 90-1196, 1990
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12939 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 26, 1990).
87. Id.at *1.
88. Id.

89. Id.
90. Id.
at *1-2.
91. Id.
at *9.

92. Id.
at *7.
93. Id.
94. Id.
at *8.
95. Id.at *10.
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accord and satisfaction. This is not to say that common law courts
are completely blind to subjective inquiries, but such questions are
not at the forefront of the common law interpretive process.
Therefore, situations exist in the common law in which
parties are
96
bound "to things which neither of them intended.,
C. Divergence of Civil Law Compromiseand Common Law
Accord and Satisfaction
As is evident from the courts' analysis in Lafon v. Rouquet,
Benoit v. Laurion, and Dick Corp. v. Union Station Redevelopment
Corp., the common law and civil law legal systems diverge in their
analysis of whether a settlement has been reached. The French
civilian tradition and its progeny engage in a subjective inquiry
before determining whether a settlement agreement has been
formed, allowing outward actions that indicate acceptance of a
compromise to "be combated by any means, even by testimonial
proof."97 The American common law tradition, on the other hand,
takes a more objective approach, focusing on the outward actions
of the parties, as opposed to their subjective beliefs, even when
there is evidence that the subjective
intent of the parties is at odds
98
with their outward actions.
While the cases presented establish the general analytical
approach undertaken by each legal system, their facts also
highlight a greater disconnect between the two doctrines: if the
alternate interpretive approach had been utilized in any of the
aforementioned cases, the result might have been the opposite.
Under an objective analysis, the Montpellier Cour d'Appel in
Lafon could have relied on the document signed by the parties and
the plain meaning of the words within that document. Taking this
approach, the court could have found that the parties did reach a
compromise. Instead, the court turned to the subjective intent of
the victim in determining that a settlement had not been reached.
Under a subjective analysis, the D.C. Circuit court in Dick Corp.
may have found a valid accord and satisfaction, as the creditor
subjectively understood the debtor's actions indicated a settlement
of the existing duty. Instead, the court focused solely on the
creditor's outward actions, finding that without an outward
manifestation of intent, there was no valid accord and satisfaction.
Thus, it is clear that while the two doctrines strive to achieve the
96. Holmes, supra note 83.
97. Benoit v. Laurion, [1943] C.S. 236, 238 (Quebec) (trans. J.-R. Trahan,
translation on file with author).
98. CORBIN, supranote 25, at 318.
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same goal, their differing analytical approaches can lead to vastly
different outcomes.
III. CAN THE Two DOCTRINES COEXIST? A LOOK AT LOUISIANA
LAW

The intersection in definition but divergence in analysis
between civil law compromise and common law accord and
satisfaction has created judicial confusion in Louisiana. Both
doctrines have been utilized by courts but in analytically
conflicting manners.
A. Louisiana Compromise-CivilLaw Compromise
Prior to June 2007, a compromise in Louisiana was defined as
"an agreement between two or more persons, who, for preventing
or putting an end to a lawsuit, adjust their differences by mutual
consent, in the manner which they agree on, and which every one
of them prefers to the hope of gaining, balanced by the danger of
losing." 9 9 In order for a valid compromise to exist, it must be
reduced to writing.'00 This definition bears striking resemblance to
the definition of compromise found in civil law jurisdictions10 1 and
has been interpreted by Louisiana courts in a similarly subjective
manner.10 2 Such a subjective analysis is highlighted in the
Louisiana cases of RTL Corp. v. Manufacturer's Enterprises,
104
Inc. 103 and Hall v. ManagementRecruiters ofNew Orleans,Inc.
99. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3071 (1994).
100. "[A compromise] must be either reduced into writing or recited in open
court and capable of being transcribed from the record of the proceeding." Id.
101. See C. Civ. art. 2044 (1999) (Fr.); C.C. art. 1809 (2006) (Spain); C.C.Q.
art. 2631 (2001) (Qu6bec).
102. Smith v. Walker, 708 So. 2d 797, 802 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied,
718 So. 2d 418 (La. 1998) ("A compromise instrument is the law between the
parties and must be interpreted according to the intent of the parties to the

agreement.").
It has been stated that "[t]he underlying reason for [the writing] requirement
is obvious-it insures that both parties fully understand the nature of the offer
avoiding the need to surmise parties' intent 'after-the-fact."' Sweet v. Iberia
Parish Sch. Bd., 746 So. 2d 256, 258 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1999), writ denied, 754
So. 2d 237 (La. 2000). Despite this statement, courts routinely engage in "afterthe-fact" inquiries of the parties' intent to determine if a valid compromise
exists. See, e.g., Willard v. R & B Falcon Drilling USA, Inc., 836 So. 2d 424,
429 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2002) (holding that when "the parties dispute exactly
what claims were clearly contemplated to be covered by the settlement, the
jurisprudential rule allowing consideration of parol evidence to determine the
parties' intent is applicable.").
103. RTL Corp. v. Mfr.'s Enters., Inc., 429 So. 2d 855 (La. 1983).
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In RTL Corp., a dispute arose between a lessor and a lessee
over the amount owed on an equipment lease. 1°5 The lessee sent
10 6
the lessor a check marked "[p]ayment in full for crane rentals."'
When the lessor telephoned the lessee to say that he only
considered the payment a partial payment, the lessee voiced no
response. 0 7 The lessor then "substituted the words 'partial
payment' for 'payment in full"' on the face of the check and
sued the lessee
deposited it.10 After failed negotiations, the lessor
09
for the remainder of the amount allegedly due.1
The trial and appellate courts found a valid accord and
satisfaction existed between the parties," 0 but the Louisiana
Supreme Court reversed, applying the doctrine of compromise.11
In doing so, the court noted that "the lower courts failed to
examine the parties' intent," and instead simply "concluded that, as
a matter of law, the creditor's deposit of a full payment check
constituted an accord and satisfaction." 112 The court pointed out
that "under [Louisiana] law whether the parties altered their
original contract or entered a transaction or compromise depends
on whether there was mutual consent."' "13 The court continued on
to examine the parties' intent and found that based on the lack of
response by the lessee on the telephone and the subsequent
partial
negotiations, the parties
1 4 "consider[ed] the tendered check as
payment of the debt." 1
RTL Corp. highlights the court's desire to look past the
outward actions of the parties and inquire into their subjective
beliefs. The RTL Corp. court could have stopped the investigation
upon finding that the lessor cashed the lessee's check, and held that
the outward actions of the lessor indicated an acceptance of the
lessee's condition that acceptance would operate as full settlement.
The court also could have held that the lessee's silence on the
telephone was a lack of outward action, and therefore there was a
lack of mutual assent to the lessor's statement that he did not

104. Hall v. Mgmt. Recruiters of New Orleans, Inc., 332 So. 2d 509 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1976).
105. RTL Corp., 429 So. 2d at 856.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at857.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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accept the check in full settlement. Instead, however, the court
looked beyond the mere outward actions of the parties and engaged
in an assessment of the parties' intent.
The case of Hall v. Management Recruiters of New Orleans,
Inc. 115 provides another example of Louisiana's preference to
examine the doctrine of compromise through a subjective lens. In
Hall, an employee resigned, demanding unpaid wages and accrued
vacation pay.11 The employer tendered a check to the employee
for less than the amount the employee believed she was owed." 7
The check included the notation, "For final payment of all back
due salaries, commissions, or any other emoluments." 118 The
employee deposited the check and then filed suit for the remainder
of the amount she believed was due. 119 The employer in Hall
moved for summary judgment based on the theory that a valid
accord and satisfaction existed. 20 The trial court entered judgment
on the employer's motion and dismissed the employee's claim. 121
On appeal, the Louisiana fourth circuit reversed, applying the
doctrine of compromise. 122 Noting the importance of evaluating
the subjective intent of the parties when determining if a valid
compromise exists, Judge Schott wrote:
[t]he simple notation on [the] check hardly establishes so as
to entitle [the employer] to a summary judgment as a matter
of law, that it offered the payment under the condition that
it be accepted as full settlement of all wage-related claims
or not at all. [The employee's] cashing the check does not
establish a clear intention on her part to accept [the
employer's] offer to compromise their differences. 121
Judge Schott continued, stating that the case facts
"demonstrate[d] that there was not necessarily a meeting of the

115. Hall v. Mgmt. Recruiters of New Orleans, Inc., 332 So. 2d 509 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1976).
116. Id. at 510.
117. Id.
118. Id. at511.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 512 (emphasis omitted). The similarities in Judge Schott's
analysis and that of Judge Archambault of the Superior Court of Qudbec are
striking. Both find the mere cashing of a check does not indicate intent to accept
payment as settlement, despite the words written on the check. For Judge
Archambault's analysis on the topic, see supra Part II.A.
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minds between [the]
24 parties so as to bring about a binding contract
of compromise."
The analysis used in Hall and RTL Corp. exemplifies the
subjective, civilian approach taken by Louisiana courts to
determine if a compromise has been reached. Instead of relying
solely on the parties' actions, the courts in both instances
demanded that attention be paid to the parties' intentions.
To be sure, it should not be implied from RTL Corp. or Hall
that Louisiana courts operate entirely in a sphere of subjectivity,
examining only the "secret and unexpressed intention[s]" of the
parties. 1z General rules of contract interpretation certainly
apply, 126 such that "[w]hen the words of a contract are clear and
explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further
127
interpretation may be made in search of the parties' intent.
However, if the intent of the parties is not clear from the language
used in the compromise agreement, "parol evidence is admissible
' 28
to clarify the ambiguity or show the intention of the parties.'
The admissibility of such evidence highlights the subjective
analysis that courts must undertake when existence of a
compromise is in question. Though intent may be shown by the
outward actions of the parties, these actions are subject to review
124. Hall, 332 So. 2d at 512.
125. First Nat. Bank of Roanoke v. Roanoke Oil Co., 192 S.E. 764, 770 (Va.
1937).
126. Ortego v. State, 689 So. 2d 1358, 1363 (La. 1997) ("A compromise
instrument is the law between the parties and must be interpreted according to
the parties' intent. It follows that the compromise instrument is governed by the
same general rules of construction applicable to contracts.") (citations omitted);
Gaubert v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 770 So. 2d 879, 881 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 2000) (stating that "the compromise instrument is the law between the
parties and must be interpreted according to the parties' true intent," but "[t]he
meaning and intent of the parties to a written instrument, including a
compromise, is ordinarily determined from the four comers of the instrument")
(citations omitted).
127. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2046 (2008). See, e.g., Smith v. Walker, 708
So. 2d 797 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 718 So. 2d 418 (La. 1998). See also
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 9 (1999) (stating that "[w]hen a law is clear and
unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law
shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search
of the intent of the legislature").
128. Willard v. R & B Falcon Drilling USA, Inc., 836 So. 2d 424, 428 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). See also Shell Oil Co. v. Jackson, 655
So. 2d 482, 486 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1995) (finding that as the documents
submitted into evidence did not "indicate the intent of the parties clearly and
unambiguously," outside testimony was allowed which showed "[t]here was no
meeting of the minds" so the "[p]laintiff failed to establish the parties had
mutual intent to settle all aspects of the litigation," thereby failing to prove a
valid compromise existed).
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to determine whether they truly capture the parties' subjective
beliefs at the time of the compromise. Therefore, as Judge Schott
said, a mere action, such as the endorsement and deposit of a
check, does not establish the requisite intent for a valid
compromise. 129
B. LouisianaAccord and Satisfaction Satisfaction with an Interpretive Twist

Common Law Accord and

Unlike compromise, prior to June 25, 2007, accord and
30
satisfaction was not provided for in Louisiana legislation.'
Despite this lack of legislative footing, the Louisiana Supreme
Court recognized the notion of accord and satisfaction as early as
1826 in the case of Findley v. Breedlove.13 1 Findley involved a
seller attempting to collect money due for the sale of a steam
engine. 132 The buyer claimed he did not owe the amount because
the steam engine was defective. 133 In reply, the seller claimed his
duty to fix the defective product was discharged because the
buyer's agent agreed that if the seller provided replacement parts
for the defective ones, any claims the buyer had against the seller
would be extinguished. 134Having performed this task, the seller
argued the dispute between the parties regarding the defective parts
settled; thus, the buyer owed the seller the full amount
had 1been
35
due.

The main question for the Findley court to address was whether
"the evidence by which it [was] contended, [an] accord and
satisfaction, [was] established.' ' 136 In answering this question, the
129. Hall, 332 So. 2d at 512.
130. Technically, the phrase "accord and satisfaction" has existed in
legislation since 1992 when the legislature adopted amendment number 1133 to
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10:1-207 (2003). Both the statute and the amendment
were part of Louisiana's partial adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC). The underlying statute provided, "A party who, with explicit reservation
of rights, performs or promises performance or assents to performance in a
manner demanded or offered by the other party does not thereby prejudice the
rights reserved. Such words as 'without prejudice', [sic] 'under protest' or the
like are sufficient." The amendment in 1992 added that, "Subsection (1) does
not apply to an accord and satisfaction." Though the amendment added the
words "accord and satisfaction" to Louisiana legislation, it can hardly be said to
be a legislative incorporation of the notion, as the legislature merely adopted the
changes to the UCC.
131. Findley v. Breedlove, 4 Mart. (n.s.) 105 (La. 1826).
132. Id.at 105.
133. Id.at 106.
134. Id.at 111-12.
135. Id.at 109.
136. Id.at 111.
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court found that a valid discharge of duties did not exist because
137
the buyer's agent lacked the capacity to represent him. 13 8
Therefore, no agreement was ever reached between the parties.
Though no accord and satisfaction was found in Findley, the court
acknowledged the doctrine and, in doing so, implicitly expressed
its willingness
to apply the doctrine if the appropriate circumstance
139
arose.

The implicit incorporation of accord and satisfaction into
Louisiana law suggested in Findley was made explicit in the case
of Sentell v. Wilcox. 140 In Sentell, the debtor delivered a check to
the creditor. 14 1 The creditor returned the check to the debtor,
claimed it was not for the full amount, and established the amount
that he believed was owed. 14 2 The debtor replied to the creditor
with two new checks bearing the words "in settlement" on their
faces. 143 The checks were, yet again, for less than the amount the
creditor had informed the debtor he was owed. 144 This time,
however, the creditor certified the 45checks, and then filed suit
against the debtor for the remainder. 1
The court found that when the creditor certified the checks
marked "in settlement," the debtor's existing debt was discharged,
despite the fact that the creditor believed he was owed more money
and had informed the debtor of that belief.146 Highlighting that the
focus of the inquiry for whether an accord and satisfaction existed
should be on the creditor's outward actions, the court said that it
was the creditor's "privilege either to return the checks and sue for
147
the whole amount, or to keep them and accept the condition."'
The court only looked to determine if the creditor did or did not
keep the checks; any subjective beliefs of the creditor went without
scrutiny.
137. Id. at 113.
138. Id. at 114.
139. Id.atlll-12.
140. Sentell v. Wilcox, 3 Teiss. 503, 507 (La. Ct. App. 1906) ("Where,
however, a sum of money is tendered in satisfaction of the claim, and tender is
accompanied with such acts and declarations as amount to a condition that if the
money is accepted it is accepted in satisfaction, and such that [t]he party to
whom it is offered is bound to understand therefrom [sic] that if he takes it he
takes it subject to such condition, an acceptance of the money offered constitutes
an accord and satisfaction.").
141. Id. at 505.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.at 507.
147. Id.
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This objective interpretation of accord and satisfaction
continued in the case of Berger v. Quintero.14 8 In Berger, the court
accepted an attorney's plea of estoppel after a client retained a
check sent by the attorney for the amount the client was owed from
a previous case settlement, minus the attorney's fee. 149 Enclosed
with the check was a statement that said "the check was for the
balance due."' 150 The client retained the check for three years
before certifying, after which he sued the attorney, claiming the
attorney did not send him the full amount.151 Focusing particularly
on the fact that the client had retained the check for three years, the
court concluded that the client was "precluded from rej ecting [the
check] and suing [the attorney] upon the entire claim." "2Like the
Sentell court, the Berger court relied solely on the parties' actions
and did not inquire as to their subjective intent.
Since the early cases of Sentell and Berger, Louisiana courts
have continued to apply the doctrine of accord and satisfaction,
setting forth requirements very similar to those requirements set
forth by American common law courts. 15 3 Not surprisingly, the
interpretation numerous Louisiana courts have applied to154accord
and satisfaction has also mirrored that of the common law.
148. Berger v. Quintero, 127 So. 356 (La. 1930).
149. Id. at 356-57. The client was awarded $5,354.12 in the partition. The
attorney sent him only $1,107.62. Id.
150. Id. at 357.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. For common law requirements, see supra note 30. For Louisiana
requirements, see Pontchartrain Park Homes, Inc. v. Sewerage & Water Bd., 168
So. 2d 595, 598 (La. 1964) (The requirements of an accord and satisfaction are
"(1) An unliquidated or a disputed claim; (2) a tender by the debtor; (3) an
acceptance of the tender by the creditor."); Henriques v. Vaccaro, 56 So. 2d 236,
239 (La. 1951) (The requirements for an accord and satisfaction are "the
presence of an unliquidated or disputed claim; a tender by the debtor of a certain
amount as settlement thereof; and an acceptance . . . ."); Charles X. Miller, Inc.
v. Oak Builders, Inc. 306 So. 2d 449, 451 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975) (The
requirements for an accord and satisfaction are "(1) there was a disputed claim
between debtor and creditor; (2) the debtor tendered a check for less than the
sum claimed by the creditor; and (3) the creditor accepted the tender by
negotiating the check."); Braudway v. United Equitable Ins. Co., 208 So. 2d
359, 360 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968) (The requirements for an accord and
satisfaction are "(1) an unliquidated or a disputed claim; (2) a tender made by
the debtor in full settlement of the claim; and (3) an acceptance of the tender by
the creditor.... ."); Davis-Wood Lumber Co. v. Farnsworth & Co., 171 So. 622,
625 (La. Ct. App. 1937) (same).
154. Louisiana courts have stated that the signing of a check with the words
"endorsed and accepted in full payment of within account" on it provides no
room for doubt that a debtor intended the check to satisfy the full obligations.
Davis-Wood Lumber Co., 171 So. at 624. See Peavy-Welsh v. Hendrix, 139 F.2d
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A more recent example highlighting this objective approach
can be seen in Henriques v. Vaccaro.155 In Henriques, an attorney
agreed to represent a client on a continzency fee basis in which
payment was to include shares of stock.' At the conclusion of the
representation, a dispute arose regarding the amount of payment,
specifically over the value of the shares.' 57 The client mailed the
attorney a check for the amount he believed was owed and
enclosed a letter stating that the check was "in full settlement of
the contract."' 158 The attorney replied to the client, detailing the
terms of the contract, and stating the value that he believed was
due, an amount which was higher than the amount delivered. 159 In
his correspondence, the attorney stated: "I have had the check you
sent me certified, and will apply the amount of same as a credit on
60
my correct fee when it is later fixed and paid by you."'
Ultimately the attorney filed suit against the client for the
remainder. 161
In Henriques, the Louisiana Supreme Court agreed
with the
162
trial court that a valid accord and satisfaction existed:
The effect of the acceptance of the check in the instant case
could only be set aside because of error or fraud, and a
careful review of the evidence has convinced us that the
plaintiff received the payment with its eyes open and it
cannot now be heard to say that its action in so doing did
not have the legal effect
163 of settling for all times the dispute
between the parties.

403, 403 (4th Cir. 1943); Mall Tool Co. v. Poulan, 40 So. 2d 512, 513 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1940); Myers v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 138 So. 443, 445 (La. Ct. App.

1931).

155. Henriques, 56 So. 2d 236.
156. Id. at 237.
157. Id. at 238.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. (emphasis omitted).
161. Id. at 237.
162. Id. at 239-40.
163. Id. at 239 (quoting from Davis-Wood Lumber Co. v. Farnsworth & Co.,
171 So. 622 (La. Ct. App. 1937)). In its conclusion, the Henriques court noted
the seeming harshness of the decision, as the attorney had gone to great pains to
avoid such results. "While we regret the inequities which sometimes result from
an impartial application of the law, nevertheless, we cannot overrule established
principles in a case which falls squarely within their scope. Dura lex, sed lex."
Id. at 240.
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The Henriques decision, like that of Berger and Sentell,
indicates the courts' reliance on the outward actions of the parties
in determining if existing claims and duties have been discharged
by accord and satisfaction. In the cases in which this approach has
been adopted, courts have ignored the parties' subjective intent,
despite arguably clear evidence that at the time the substitute
performance was accepted the actions of the parties were not
indicative of their intent.
While the aforementioned cases suggest that Louisiana courts
apply an objective analysis when determining if a valid accord and
satisfaction exists, the courts have not always followed this rule.
On numerous occasions, the courts have instead adopted a more
subjective approach. 164 An example of such an interpretation can
be found in Selber Bros., Inc. v. Newstadt's Shoe Stores, in which
the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that when the evidence does
not show that the parties understood or intended for the discharge
of all liabilities from the acceptance of payment, no valid accord
and satisfaction exists. 165 In Selber Bros., a lessor and lessee had a
contract by which the lessee agreed to pay rent of a stipulated
amount plus a fixed percentage of monthly sales. 166 After failing to
conduct business on the leased premises for several months, the
lessee paid the lessor the stipulated amount of rent but did not
include any percentage of monthly sales. 167 The lessee told the
lessor that the amount in the checks constituted "all [he was] going
to pay."' 68 Ignoring this statement, the lessor deposited the rent
payments and then sued the lessee for a percentage of monthly
sales. 169 The lessee argued that the lessor was not entitled to any
additional payment because acceptance of
the original checks
0
constituted a valid accord and satisfaction.17
164. See, e.g., Selber Bros., Inc. v. Newstadt's Shoe Stores, 14 So. 2d 10, 13
(La. 1943) (holding that when the evidence does not show that the parties
understood or intended for the discharge of all liabilities from the acceptance of
payment, no valid accord and satisfaction exists); Pool Co. v. Universal Mach.
Co., 701 So. 2d 1014, 1016 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1997) (holding that "[e]ssential to
a valid accord and satisfaction is that the creditor understands that the payment
is tendered in full settlement of the dispute," and, therefore, if the terms of the
contract do not ascertain the intent of the parties, "parol evidence is admissible
to... show the intention of the parties") (emphasis omitted); McClelland v. Sec.
Indus. Ins. Co., 426 So. 2d 665, 670 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982), writ denied, 430
So. 2d 94 (La. 1983) (same).
165. Selber Bros., Inc., 14 So. 2d at 14.
166. Id.at 11.
167. Id.
168. Id at 13.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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The Selber Bros. court rejected the lessee's theory, noting that
"[t]here was nothing in writing" to indicate that the checks would
operate as full satisfaction if accepted. 17 1 Despite the conversation
between the lessor and lessee, the court found that the evidence did
not show that the parties "understood or intended that the discharAe
of all liabilities would result from the acceptance" of payment.
As such, the court found that the lessor was entitled to a percentage
of monthly sales. 173 This reasoning highlights a willingness of the
court to look past the outward actions of the parties and also
examine their subjective intent in determining whether a dispute
has been settled through accord and satisfaction.
Henriques174 and Selber Bros.175 represent divergent methods
of analyzing accord and satisfaction in Louisiana. Henriques
highlights a great deference for objectivity, despite subjective
intent to the contrary. 176 Selber Bros. represents a leaning towards
subjectivity, despite the parties' outward actions.17 7 These cases
may be viewed as the endpoints of a spectrum that balances an
objective analysis with a subjective inquiry. As with any spectrum,
there are cases that fall somewhere in between.
On the more subjective end of the spectrum, courts have said
that the cashing of a check with the words "full payment" on the
back is not necessarily an acceptance of the check as full
settlement, if, based on past performances of the debtor the
creditor does not believe the check is for full settlement.17 8 In
Antoine v. Elder Realty Co., the Louisiana third circuit found that
the creditor had no reason to conclude that the checks were
tendered in full settlement because the debtor "frequently failed to
make full monthly payments" while "accompany[ing] his
payments with slips of paper indicating 'part payment' or 'full
payment.""' 179 The court's analysis focused on the creditor's
beliefs, as opposed to his actions, but required those beliefs to be
shaped by the outward actions of the debtor. Such a situation

171. Id.at 14.
172. Id.
173. Id. The percentage owed was determined based on the average amount
of previous monthly sales. Id.
174. Henriques v. Vaccaro, 56 So. 2d 236 (La. 1951).
175. Selber Bros., Inc., 14 So. 2d 10.
176. Henriques, 56 So. 2d at 239.
177. SelberBros., Inc., 14 So. 2d at 13.
178. Antoine v. Elder Realty Co., 255 So. 2d 625, 629 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
179. Id.

204

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

indicates that the 80understanding between the parties trumps the
actions they take.'
Leaning more towards the objective end of the spectrum, courts
have said that "[t]he unilateral action of the creditor in changing
the endorsement on the reverse side of the check from payment in
full to a partial payment" does not negate acceptance of the check
as full satisfaction.' 8 1 In fact, such actions suggest the creditor
"was fully aware of the nature of the tender."' These holdings
indicate reliance by the courts on the outward actions of the
parties, though in such situations the courts note that the parties'
actions reflect their subjective intent.
C. The Tangled Web ofJudicial Confusionfor Louisiana
Settlement Agreements
The application of the doctrine of accord and satisfaction alone
has been problematic for Louisiana jurisprudence, as the principles
of objectivity and subjectivity are in constant competition. 8 3 The
existence of the doctrine of compromise in Louisiana further
compounds this confusion, as the concept has been most often
applied in a subjective manner.' 84 Attempting to determine how
these two doctrines work--or perhaps do not work-together is
taxing both on the mind and on the jurisprudence.
At least one Louisiana court has recognized the dissonance
between the doctrines. In Davis-Wood Lumber, Co. v. Farnsworth
& Co., the Orleans appellate court applied the doctrine of accord
and satisfaction to determine if a dispute between a subcontractor
and general contractor had been settled. 185 The subcontractor and
general contractor disagreed about the amount of money the
general contractor owed the subcontractor.' 86 After attempting
negotiations to no avail, the general contractor sent the
subcontractor a check with the notation "endorsed and accepted in
180. See also Hebert v. D. Frugd, Contractor, Inc., 192 So. 2d 574, 575 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1966) (finding accord and satisfaction did not exist because "there
was no agreement between the parties that the check sent by defendant to
plaintiff and cashed by plaintiff was in full payment of the indebtedness").
181. Charles X. Miller, Inc. v. Oak Builders, Inc., 306 So. 2d 449, 452 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1975). See Harrington v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 411 So. 2d 1255,
1257 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
182. Eppling v. Jon-T Chems., Inc., 363 So. 2d 1263, 1266 (La. App. 4th Cir.

1978).

183. Supra Part III.B.
184. Supra Part III.A.
185. Davis-Wood Lumber Co. v. Farnsworth & Co., 171 So. 622, 624 (La.
Ct. App. 1937).
186. Id.
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full payment of within account" on its face. 187 The subcontractor
deposited the check and sued the general contractor for the
remainder. 188 The court found the dispute was settled when the
subcontractor cashed the check. 189 In reaching this conclusion,
however, the court noted that the result would have been different
had the doctrine of compromise been applied. 190 "[T]he effect of
compromise
the acceptance of [a] check may not be considered as a91
as defmed by the Code" due to a lack of consideration.'
Though the court cited a lack of consideration as the reason
why the result under compromise would have been altered, the
court more appropriately should have said that a different result
would have been reached under the doctrine of compromise
because of the parties' subjective intent. Immediately prior to
receipt of the check, the subcontractor had made known to the
general contractor the amount it believed it was owed. 192 Given the
negotiations between the two parties,' 93 it is implausible that the
general contractor truly believed when sending the check that all
prior existing claims and duties would be discharged.
Be that as it may, the comment of the Davis-Wood Lumber Co.
court does shed light on the inherent problem with the manner in
which civilian compromise and common law accord and
satisfaction have coexisted in Louisiana. Both strive to achieve the
same end-to terminate disagreements through settlement rather
than judgment-but they employ different means to reach that end.
Compromise follows a more subjective course, balancing the
parties' beliefs with their outward actions. Accord and satisfaction,
on the other hand, pursues a more objective analysis in which the
parties' actual intent is not necessarily determinative. However, at
other times, courts applying the doctrine of accord and satisfaction
engage in a more subjective inquiry, allowing the parties' inner
beliefs to trump the actions they take. Because of these differences,
similar fact patterns have led to conflicting opinions depending
upon what doctrine is applied. This creates the impression that the
"black letter law" of Louisiana settlement agreements is entangled

187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.For purposes of a civil law compromise, it is more appropriate to
state that the compromise would not exist for lack of reciprocal concessions, not
for lack of consideration.
192. Id. at 624.
193. Id.
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as follows: the mere signing 194 or depositing' 95 of a check does not
establish the intent necessary for a valid compromise, but the
cashing of a check does constitute a valid accord and satisfaction,
even when the creditor expressly informs the debtor that he does
not believe the check was paid in full settlement; 196 however, the
cashing of a check does not constitute a valid accord and
satisfaction if the creditor does not intend for an accord and
satisfaction to exist, regardless if the debtor relays his intent to the
creditor that payment is given in full settlement. 197 Judicial
confusion has clearly run rampant.
IV. THE 2007 REVISION: A SOLUTION?

Such judicial confusion reflects the two problems regarding
settlement agreements in Louisiana. First, conflicting interpretations
of the doctrine of accord and satisfaction have been adopted.
Second, one interpretation of accord and satisfaction-arguably the
more frequently used interpretation-works at odds with the
doctrine of compromise.
The recent revision to the compromise articles, however, may
have mitigated these problems. To determine if that is so, the same
questions asked before must be answered again: under the new
articles, what is a compromise? What is accord and satisfaction?
How will the two doctrines be interpreted?
A. Louisiana Compromise Remains the Same
The recent revisions of the Civil Code did little in the way of
altering Louisiana's doctrine of compromise. 198 A compromise is
defined by article 3071 as "a contract whereby the parties, through
concessions made by one or more of them, settle a dispute or an
uncertainty concerning an obligation or other legal relationship. ' 199
The new articles also maintain the writing requirement for a valid
compromise by stating that "[a] compromise shall be made in
194. Hall v. Mgmt. Recruiters of New Orleans, Inc., 332 So. 2d 509, 512 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1976).
195. RTL Corp. v. Mfr.'s Enters., Inc., 429 So. 2d 855, 857 (La. 1983).
196. Henriques v. Vaccaro, 56 So. 2d 236 (La. 1951); Davis-Wood Lumber
Co., 171 So. 622.
197. Selber Bros., Inc. v. Newstadt's Shoe Stores, 14 So. 2d 10, 14 (La.
1943).
198. Compare LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3071 (Supp. 2008) with LA. CIv.
CODE ANN. art. 3071 (1994). For the text of article 3071 in 2007 prior to the
revision, see supra Part III.A.
199. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3071.
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writing or recited in open court, in which case the recitation shall
be susceptible20 0 of being transcribed from the record of the
proceedings.
Since little definitional change was made to the doctrine of
compromise, one can expect that little interpretive change will
occur. Courts examining a compromise agreement will continue to
scrutinize the subjective intent of the parties, particularly when
their outward actions create an uncertainty as to what that intent
was. Therefore, a lone action, such as endorsing or depositing a
to establish the requisite
check, may continue to be insufficient
2 1
intent for a valid compromise. 0
B. LouisianaAccord and Satisfaction-CommonLaw Accord and
Satisfaction, no Twist
Following the revision, article 3079 provides that "[a]
compromise is also made when the claimant of a disputed or
unliquidated claim, regardless of the extent of his claim, accepts a
payment that the other party tenders with the clearly expressed
written condition that acceptance of the payment will extinguish
the obligation." 20 2 The comments establish that this article is the
"validation ... of the dispute- settling [sic] mechanism known at
common law as accord and satisfaction." 20 3 Under this definition,
accord and satisfaction requires: (1) the existence of a disputed or
unliquidated claim and (2) offer and acceptance of a substitute
to
payment in full settlement. These requirements are quite similar
2 4
0
the requirements previously provided by Louisiana courts.
200. LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 3072 (Supp. 2008).
201. Supra Part III.A.
202. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 3079 (Supp. 2008).
203. Id. cmt. a.
204. Supra note 153. These requirements are also very similar to the
requirements for a valid accord and satisfaction in the common law, though not
identical. The Louisiana codified version of accord and satisfaction only applies
to disputed or unliquidated claims, whereas the common law accord and
satisfaction applies to all prior existing claims and duties. Though litigation over
undisputed or liquidated claims is not as common as litigation over disputed or
unliquidated claims, it is worth noting that should litigation in the former
instance arise in Louisiana, article 3079 would not apply. An example of such a
situation is the earlier stated hypothetical in which Jack and Jill agree Jack is
owed $15, and then subsequently agree Jill will pay Jack $10 plus her collection
of eggshells. In this situation, though, Jill's substitute performance of the $10
plus eggshells operates as an accord and satisfaction under the common law.
However, under Louisiana law, it would not operate as an accord and
satisfaction because the claim was not disputed or unliquidated. Instead, in
Louisiana, it would effectuate an objective novation or dation en paiement. See
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 1881 (2008), 2655 (2005).
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Though the definition of accord and satisfaction reflects the
definition previously adopted in the Louisiana jurisprudence, there
is a substantial change in the placement of the doctrine. Whereas
accord and satisfaction was previously not embedded in
legislation, it is now. Giving the doctrine legislative footing was a
goal of the Louisiana State Law Institute during the redrafting
process,206 clearly indicating the civilian desire to incorporate
accord and satisfaction into a primary source of law. In civil law
systems, including Louisiana, 2 7 jurisprudence is not a primary
source of law. 20 8 Therefore, while courts have applied the doctrine
of accord and satisfaction for decades, the doctrine lacked
authority from the Civil Code,20 9 which in turn meant the courts
205. The Louisiana State Law Institute (LSLI) is an institute "dedicated to
law revision, law reform and legal research." John H. Tucker, Jr., President of
the Louisiana State Law Institute, Address at the First Annual Meeting (Mar. 16,
1940) (transcript available at http://www.lsi.org). See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 24:201 (2007) (stating the Institute is "chartered, created and organized as an
official advisory law revision commission, law reform agency and legal research
agency of the state of Louisiana"). As part of its duties, the LSLI considers
needed improvements to Louisiana law and makes recommendations of those
improvements to the state legislature. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24:204(1) (2007).
Beginning in 1997, the LSLI began redrafting the Civil Code articles on
transaction and compromise. The revisions were submitted to the state
legislature in the 2007 Regular Session as House Bill 73.
206. Louisiana State Law Institute, Policy Questions Prepared for Meeting of
the Council 7 (Nov. 14-15, 1997) (on file with Louisiana State Law Institute)
("Since the doctrine of accord and satisfaction is well established in the
Louisiana jurisprudence, it seems advisable to incorporate that doctrine into the
Louisiana statutory framework.").
207. In Louisiana, primary sources of law include legislation and custom. LA.
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 (1999).
208. For a discussion on civilian sources of law, see FRAN(;OIs GtNY,
METHODE D'INTERPRETATION ET SOURCES EN DRO1T PRIVE POSITIF 19-27
(trans. La. State Law Inst., 1963) (1954).
209. On multiple occasions, then Judge Lemmon remarked on the lack of
authority for the doctrine of accord and satisfaction in the Civil Code, noting
that it was "unnecessary and 'uncivilian' to import the common law doctrine of
accord and satisfaction to decide issues involving transaction and compromise."
Terra Trucks, Inc. v. Weber, 346 So. 2d 275, 276 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977)
(Lemmon, J., concurring). See also La. Nat'l Bank of Baton Rouge v. Heindel,
365 So. 2d 37, 39 (La. 1978) (Lemmon, J., concurring). In Terra Trucks, Inc., a
debtor sent a creditor a check for less than the amount the creditor believed was
due. 346 So. 2d at 275. The check included no notation on it that it was given in
full settlement. Id.The creditor cashed the check and sued the debtor for the
remainder. Id.Despite the debtor's claim to the contrary, the majority found that
a valid accord and satisfaction had not discharged the debtor's duty to pay the
creditor the full amount because the debtor had not informed the creditor that
"the check was being tendered in full settlement of the entire debt." Id.at 276.
Justice Lemmon, concurring in result, stated that he "prefer[ed] to decide this
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had no legislative guidance as to how the doctrine should be
defined or interpreted. Arguably, the lack of legislative placement
and guidance is at least part of the reason that two divergent
interpretations of accord and satisfaction developed in the
Louisiana jurisprudence.
Though the doctrine now has legislative footing, the question
remains as to how the newly enacted article will be interpreted.2 10
Courts could focus solely on the outward actions of the parties, or
courts may engage in a more subjective inquiry. Examining the
text of the article, the most likely analytical approach that courts
will take is the former. Article 3079 states that the claimant must
accept a payment with a "clearly expressed written condition that
acceptance of the payment will extinguish the obligation. ' 21' This
means that two actions must occur in order for an accord and
satisfaction to exist. First, there must be a payment made with a
condition on its face that clearly establishes that the payment is
given with the intent of extinguishing the existing duty. Second,
the claimant must accept the payment. This reading leads to the
conclusion that courts should engage in an objective analysis,
disregarding any subjective intent of the parties. The court should
only look to see if the two requirements are met; if the requisite
condition is placed on the face of the payment, and if the claimant
accepts that payment, then a valid accord and satisfaction exists. A
court need only determine first, if Jill included words on the face
of her check that fulfilled the "clearly expressed written condition"
requirement of article 3079, words such as "in full settlement," and
second, if Jack took some action to accept the check, such as
endorsing or depositing it. If both occur, Jill's existing obligation
to Jack is extinguished by accord and satisfaction, and any
subjective belief Jack--or Jill-had to the contrary is irrelevant.
To reach this conclusion, though, the court must ensure that it
clearly defines what actions fulfill these two requirements. In other

case by simply citing the appropriate article," the appropriate article being
article 3071 on compromise. Id. (Lemmon, J., concurring).
Similar criticisms of the use of the non-legislatively established doctrine of
accord and satisfaction have been raised in other mixed jurisdictions. In Puerto
Rico, the judicial incorporation of accord and satisfaction "has been criticized
[by scholars] because the same results could be obtained using the transaction
contract." Ennio M. Col6n Garcia et al., Puerto Rico: A Mixed Legal System:
Emergence of New Legal Creations, 32 REv. JURIDICA U. INTER. P.R. 291, 293
(1998).
210. As of September 5, 2008, no court has interpreted article 3079 following
the revision.
211. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3079 (Supp. 2008).
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words, the court must establish what qualifies as a "clearly
expressed written condition" and what qualifies as an
"acceptance."
212
Through basic civilian interpretive techniques,
Louisiana
courts can readily determine what constitutes a "clearly expressed
written condition" and an "acceptance." Following the legal
maxim interpretatiocessat in claris,213 the plain text of the article
states that there must be a "clearly expressed written condition that
acceptance of the payment will extinguish the obligation,"
meaning that all that is required are words clearly expressing that
the payment is intended to discharge prior existing claims and
duties. This suggests that phrases such as "in full settlement," "in
full payment," and "in full indebtedness" will meet the required
written condition. Indeed, these exact phrases have previously been
found to provide no room for doubt that the debtor intended the
check to satisfy the existing obligation. 214 Such an interpretation
would also not disrupt holdings like that of Selber Bros., as there
was no actual writini involved; the "condition" was merely said
aloud by the debtor.' 1 From a purely plain text reading of the
article, courts are likely to hold that such phrases qualify as the
required "clearly expressed written condition."
Courts must also determine what constitutes an acceptance of
the payment. Following the technical meaning 216 of the word
"accepts" as it relates to contracts in the Civil Code, courts may
conclude that the inquiry should center around the outward actions
of the parties. "When an offeror invites an offeree to accept by
performance... [the] contract is formed when the offeree begins
the requested performance. 2 17 Under this general principle of
212. The Louisiana Civil Code establishes how laws are to be interpreted.
See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 9-13 (1999).
213. Interpretation ends in clarity. For Louisiana's codified acceptance of
this manner of interpretation, see LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 9 (1999).
214. See, e.g., Peavy-Welsh Lumber Co. v. Hendrix, 139 F.2d 403, 403 (4th
Cir. 1943); Mall Tool Co. v. Poulan, 40 So. 2d 512, 513 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1940); Davis-Wood Lumber Co. v. Farnsworth & Co., 171 So. 622, 624 (La. Ct.
App. 1937); Myers v. Acme Homestead Assoc., 138 So. 443, 445 (La. Ct. App.
1931).
215. Selber Bros., Inc. v. Newstadt's Shoe Stores, 14 So. 2d 10, 14 (La.
1943).
216. "The words of a law must be given their generally prevailing meaning.
Words of art and technical terms must be given their technical meaning when
the law involves a technical matter." LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 11 (1999).
217. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1939 (2008). Recall that under the common
law, an accord and satisfaction may exist when a debtor invites a creditor to
accept by performance. There need not be a prior agreement between the parties;
the creditor may merely accept the debtor's offer, in which case acceptance of a
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contract law in Louisiana, whether a party has accepted an offer is
judged based on the party's action, not the party's intention. When
Jack endorses Jill's check, he has begun the requested
performance, that performance being to accept the check as full
payment. Thus, it is Jack's outward action that determines
acceptance, not his subjective intent.
Such an interpretation is also to be expected when evaluating
past Louisiana jurisprudence. Numerous courts have held that
endorsing a check, 2 cashing a check, 219 and even retaining a
check for an extended period of time220 constitutes acceptance. An
objective analysis based on the outward actions of the parties
would give credence to such interpretations. The comments to
article 3079 state that the new article "is not intended to change the
law." 22 ' The "law" prior to the revision-again, according to the
comments-is represented by objectively analyzed cases, such as
Berger v. Quintero.22 Thus, the continuance of such past
interpretations appears to be the intention of the new article.
Furthermore, accord and satisfaction was incorporated from the
common law. In the American common law, whether a party has
accepted a payment that discharges a prior existing duty is
determined by examining the party's outward actions, not the
party's intentions. 22 3 As Louisiana is incorporating
224 this common
law notion, it should also incorporate its analysis. By using the phrase "accepts a payment," the drafters of the
article also ended the dispute as to what to do if the creditor
performs two actions that indicate a conflict between the subjective
intent and the outward actions of the creditor. If Jack cashes the
check after crossing out the words "in full settlement," there is now
no question whether the parties have settled. Under article 3079
they have because Jack has accepted the payment. The article does
not require Jack to accept the condition; it only requires for the

substitute performance in full settlement and performance of that substitute
performance occur simultaneously. Supra Part I.B.
218. Davis- Wood Lumber Co., 171 So. at 624.
219. Henriques v. Vaccaro, 56 So. 2d 236, 239 (La. 1951).
220. Berger v. Quintero, 127 So. 356, 357 (La. 1930).
221. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3079 cmt. a (Supp. 2008).
222. Id.
223. Supra Part II.B.
224. When interpreting legislation that has been incorporated from an outside
source, the "interpreter must examine the sources, if any, from which that
legislation was taken." Katie Drell Grissel, Comment, The Legal Fiction of
"Clear Text" in Willis-Knighton v. Caddo-Shreveport Sales and Use Tax
Commission, 67 LA. L. REv. 523, 536 (2007).
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condition to be on the payment and for Jack to accept the
payment. 225 By cashing the check he has accepted the payment;
whatever he does to the "condition" on the payment is of no
concern to the court.
The only plausible exegetical argument that can reasonably be
made for the use of the parties' subjective intent in determining
whether the claimant has accepted the check is that the doctrine of
accord and satisfaction has been placed within the Civil Code
section on compromise. 2 6 Therefore, in pari materia, accord and
satisfaction should be interpreted in the same manner as
compromise. As compromise invites a more subjective analysis to
occur,227 accord and satisfaction should also be examined under a
subjective lens. Such an analysis would allow courts to utilize
Judge Schott's statement in Hall that "cashing 2 a] check does not
establish a clear intention" to accept the offer. In applying this
analysis when determining if a party has accepted a payment, the
court would need to look not only at the outward actions of the
parties, but at their subjective intent as well.
Though this argument is validated by the interpretive methods
provided in the Civil Code, 229 the counter is readily apparent:
generalia specialibus non derogant.23 As defined, accord and
satisfaction is a subset of compromise.2 3 1 Therefore, the rules
225. The implication of the requirement that the claimant accept the payment
is that in accepting the payment, the claimant is also accepting the condition on
the payment. Be that as it may, the text of the article only requires that the
claimant accept the actual payment.
226. Article 3079 is found within Book III (Of the Different Modes of
Acquiring the Ownership of Things), Title XVII (Of Transaction and
Compromise).
227. Supra Part III.A.
228. Hall v. Mgmt. Recruiters of New Orleans, Inc., 332 So. 2d 509, 512 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1976).
229. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 13 (1999) ("Laws on the same subject matter
must be interpreted in reference to each other.").
230. Special dispositions derogate from general dispositions.
231. Article 3079 begins by stating that "[a] compromise is also made
when . . . ." LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 3079 (Supp. 2008). This definition
establishes that accord and satisfaction is a form of compromise. It is interesting
to note that draft versions of the article-as presented to the Louisiana State
Law Institute-by and large did not define an accord and satisfaction as a
compromise. Draft versions instead stated that an accord and satisfaction "[had]
the effect of a transaction or compromise" or "assimilated to a compromise."
See Louisiana State Law Institute, Minutes of Meeting of the Council 2-3 (Oct.
17-18, 2003) (on file with the Louisiana State Law Institute); Louisiana State
Law Institute, Accord and Satisfaction Prepared for Meeting of the Council 6-7
(Apr. 19, 1999) (on file with the Louisiana State Law Institute); Louisiana State
Law Institute, Accord and Satisfaction Prepared for Meeting of the Committee
6-7 (Apr. 9, 1999) (on file with the Louisiana State Law Institute).
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regarding the more specific type of compromise should apply.
Even if the subjective intent of the parties is examined under the
doctrine of compromise in general, the outward actions of the
parties should suffice when applying the doctrine of accord and
satisfaction in particular.
The majority of reasonable interpretations of article 3079 favor
the application of an objective analysis in determining if a valid
accord and satisfaction exists. This being the case, courts should
look solely at the parties' outward actions to determine if the
appropriate condition was placed on the payment, and, if so,
whether the claimant accepted the payment. If these actions
required by article 3079 have occurred, then the court should hold
that the prior existing claims and duties have been discharged
through accord and satisfaction. Accepting this interpretation of
the newly enacted article means that codification of accord and
satisfaction has solved the first problem relating to Louisiana
settlement agreements: it has provided an answer for the analytical
method courts should use to determine if a valid accord and
satisfaction is present. Courts should apply an objective analysis in
making such a determination, focusing on the outward actions of
the parties.
C. Can the Two Doctrines Coexist in Louisiana?
Assuming arguendo that the above analysis is adopted by the
Louisiana courts, the second problem-whether the civilian form
of compromise can coexist with the common law doctrine of
accord and satisfaction in Louisiana-appears to remain
unresolved. If accord and satisfaction is interpreted to require an
objective analysis, and compromise remains interpreted through a
more subjective inquiry, then for the cases in which either doctrine
could be used-those cases including an existing dispute that is
allegedly settled by a substitute performance 232-the outcome of
the case appears to continue to depend upon what article is applied.
At first glance, the state of discord between the settlement
agreements seems to be perpetuated in the revision.
However, a closer reading of the revised articles indicates that
a method for determining when which article should be followed
has been provided. For a valid accord and satisfaction to exist,
there must be a "clearly expressed written condition that
acceptance of payment will extinguish the obligation." 233 This is
not an explicit requirement for a valid compromise. For a
232.
233.

Supra Part I.C.
LA. CIv. CODE ANN.

art. 3079 (Supp. 2008).
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234
compromise to exist, the contract must be made in writing.
However, there is no requirement set forth by the Civil Code that
the written compromise must include a clearly expressed written
condition that acceptance of the payment will extinguish the prior
obligation. Certainly the intention of ending or preventing
litigation must be present for a valid compromise to exist,235 but
those intentions need not be clearly or expressly stated in the
agreement. 236 Therefore, if there is a clearly expressed written
condition on the face of the payment that establishes that the
payment is meant to extinguish the obligation, then the more
specific form of compromise-accord and satisfaction as defined
in article 3079-should be applied. However, if there is no such
condition on the payment, then the general form of compromiseas defined in article 3071-should be applied. This interpretation is
supported by comment (b) to article 3079, which provides that
"[a]n act that fails to meet the requirements for accord and
meets the general
satisfaction may be a valid compromise if it 237
requirements for the validity of a compromise.9
If Jill's check meets the specific requirements of an accord and
satisfaction by having on it a "clearly expressed written condition
that acceptance of payment will extinguish the obligation," then
whether the two have settled is a question of accord and
satisfaction under article 3079, and the courts should look solely at
the outward actions of the parties. If this specific requirement does
not exist on Jill's check, then whether the two have settled is a
question of compromise under article 3071, and the courts should

234. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3072 (Supp. 2008).
235. Supra Part I.A.
236. Revised article 3076 provides that "[a] compromise settles only those
differences that the parties clearly intended to settle, including the necessary
consequences of what they express." LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3076 (Supp.
2008). The comments provide that this is a reproduction of article 3073, which
provided that "[t]ransactions regulate only the differences which appear clearly
to be comprehended in them by the intention of the parties, whether it be
explained in a general or particular manner, unless it be the necessary
consequence of what is expressed ...... LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 3073 (1994).
As interpreted, article 3073 in the 2006 Civil Code did not require that parties
provide a clearly expressed written condition that acceptance of the compromise
would extinguish the prior existing obligation. See Angelo & Son v. Rapides
Bank & Trust Co., 671 So. 2d 1283 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 675 So. 2d
1083 (La. 1996). In Angelo, the dispute concerned whether the compromise
agreement between the parties was for full settlement of all existing claims. Id.
at 1286-87. The court found that the compromise did settle all disagreements
between the parties because the parties "understood that the agreement would
end all problems," though such was not explicitly written in the compromise
agreement. Id.at 1287.
237. LA. CMv. CODE ANN. art. 3079 cmt. b (Supp. 2008).
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look at the subjective intent of the parties as well as at their
outward actions.
Reading revised article 3079 with articles 3071 and 3072
provides a clear method for parties to determine whether a court
will examine an alleged settlement agreement under the doctrine of
compromise or the doctrine of accord and satisfaction. In doing so,
the revision solves the second problem that existed in Louisiana
settlement agreements. The web ofjudicial confusion is untangled.
CONCLUSION

Jill makes a deal with Jack: she will pay him to provide her
with a pail of water. Jack agrees, fetches a pail, and sends Jill a bill
for $15. Jill replies with a $10 check, noting on the back, "In full
settlement." Jack sees the notation, cashes the check, and sends a
letter to Jill stating, "I cashed your check, but you still owe me $5."
Can Jack sue Jill?
Prior to the 2007 revision of the compromise articles, the
answer was unclear, but following the revision, the answer in
Louisiana is firmly no. On the check there was a clearly expressed
written condition that acceptance would extinguish the obligation.
Jack accepted the check at the time he cashed it. Therefore, the
requirements for a valid accord and satisfaction in Louisiana exist.
Had Jill not included such a notation on the check, then whether
the parties reached a settlement would be a question of
compromise, in which case the court would examine not only the
outward actions of the parties, but also their subjective intent.
If this interpretation of the revised articles herein described is
adopted, then the revision will have successfully ended the judicial
confusion surrounding Louisiana settlement agreements. The
revision establishes the analytical method to be used when
applying the doctrine of accord and satisfaction and provides a
clear manner for determining under what circumstances to apply
each settlement agreement. As such, the general policy desire to
end disputes in settlement rather than judgment 238 is now furthered
instead of hindered. The revision has clarified the law, such that
now creditors and debtors are-or at least should be-aware of
their rights and duties, thereby decreasing legal uncertainty, which
arguably will lead to less litigation.239
The subsidence ofjudicial confusion that will likely result from
the revision does come at a price, one not mentioned in the
documents prepared by the Louisiana State Law Institute or in the
238. Supra note 3.
239. Priest & Klein, supranote 4.
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testimony that was given on the revision of the compromise
articles before the Louisiana House Committee on Civil Law and
Procedure of the Louisiana State Legislature. 240 The cost of the
doctrine of accord and satisfaction is that the law will inevitably
trap some individuals
into unintentionally discharging prior
24 1
existing obligations.
As infantile as the dispute of Jack and Jill may seem, it is
indicative of the situation that will occur in real life, though the
real life dispute will not revolve around a pail of water and a five
dollar bill. A creditor will receive a check with the proper notated
condition on it. The creditor will send the debtor a note stating that
the check has been cashed, but that such action should not be
viewed as acceptance of the payment in full settlement. When the
debtor fails to pay further, the creditor will file suit. Following the
revision, the court should dismiss the creditor's action based on his
cashing the check. In doing so, the court should pay no heed to the
creditor's actions attempting to prevent such a result, and the court
should ignore the creditor's subjective intent at the time he
"accepted" payment. The only questions should be what was
written on the check and what the creditor did with that check.
This fact pattern exists in every Louisiana case discussed
herein in which accord and satisfaction was applied under an
objective analysis. The creditor always believed that his actions
would not discharge the prior obligation because he had
manifested such belief through some outward action, be it by
writing the debtor, calling the debtor, or taking some other action.
240. The only testimony regarding the incorporation of article 3079
presented during the hearing in front of the House Civil Law and Procedure
Committee was as follows:
We have something called accord and satisfaction, which is a common
law device and we are making it part of our Code. It's just like a
compromise. It's if you've got a disputed claim, and I say, "Look, here
is $1,000 for that $3,000 claim. And you say okay." That's accord and
satisfaction. If that's in writing, it is a compromise. That's important
because there are a lot of provisions relating to compromise that would
not relate to accord and satisfaction. This is not a significant change at
all because the accord and satisfaction can exist anyway.
Archived Broadcasts of House of Representatives Civil Law Committee
Meeting (May 15, 2007), http://house.louisiana.gov/rmarchive/Ram/RamMay
07/0515 07 CLP.ram (testimony of William E. Crawford, Director of Louisiana
State Law Institute).
241. That this would result from the incorporation of a common law doctrine
is of no surprise upon recognition that, generally, the common law places a
greater emphasis on transactional security and efficiency than on morality,
whereas the civil law promotes the latter over the former. NICHOLAS, supra note
60, at 212 ("French law takes a moral stance while English law emphasizes the
security of transactions and economic efficiency.").
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However, in all of these cases, the courts always found the existing
duties had been discharged, despite the creditor's efforts to the
contrary. Therefore, in every case, the creditor unintentionally
discharged existing obligations.
Some may argue that this side effect of adopting the doctrine of
accord and satisfaction is not a negative one, as creditors should be
more mindful when accepting payments. Some may also argue that
this is, in fact, a positive effect, as creditors should not be allowed
to unilaterally alter the terms and conditions proposed by debtors.
Reasonable minds may certainly differ as to whether the effects of
the revision are positive or negative.
But at the end of the day, when rules regarding how parties
enter into agreements are altered, a policy decision must be made:
should the rules err on the side of binding people to contracts when
they do not intend to be bound, or should the rules err on the side
of not enforcing contracts when people intend for contracts to be
enforced? During the 2007 regular legislative session, Louisianaperhaps unwittingly-opted to adopt the former policy. In doing
so, the previous judicial confusion regarding settlement agreements
was inarguably cleared up, but at a price. As such, the state of the
agreements can now best be
law in Louisiana regarding settlement
2 42
described as "[d]ura lex, sed lex.
Sally Brown Richardson*

242. The law is harsh, but it is the law. Henriques v. Vaccaro, 56 So. 2d 236,
240 (La. 1951) (emphasis added).
* Recipient of the Association Henri Capitant, Louisiana Chapter, Award
for best paper on a civil law topic or a comparative law topic with an emphasis
in the civil law.
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